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The Potential Of Expanded Arbitration In Resolving
Title VII Claims In Light Of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver And New Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Policy
Arbitration: a Footnote's Chance
INTRODUCTION
It seems to me desirable that employment discrimination cases be
heard by arbitrators wherever possible because of the complicated
and time-consuming nature of Title VII litigation in the Federal
Courts and the huge backlog with which the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is now confronted. Delay and protracted
litigation permit open wounds to fester. But traditional arbitration
procedures are no answer to this problem.'
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,' a unanimous Supreme
Court held that arbitration of a discrimination grievance would not
bar a subsequent Title VIII action in federal court.4 The Court,
1. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620, 624 (1975)
(Gould, Arbitrator). William B. Gould: Member, National Academy of Arbitrators; Professor
of Law, Stanford Law School, Stanford, California.
2. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (1970).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by an employer, labor organization or employment
agency. Section 2000e-2 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify
or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for mem-
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or other-
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however, also suggested that arbitral decisions could be admitted
into evidence and accorded such weight as a trial court deems ap-
propriate.' After listing general factors' to be considered in deter-
mining the weight afforded an arbitrator's decision the Court main-
tained that:
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great
weight.7
The case of Basic Vegetable Products, Inc. and Teamsters Local
890,8 evidences an attempt by the parties and the arbitrator to com-
ply with the standards promulgated by the Court in Alexander. The
case also underlines the importance of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission's (EEOC) role as protector of Title VII
rights.'
In Basic Vegetable Products the grievant' ° alleged discriminatory
practices by her employer which violated both Title VII and the
collective bargaining agreement between management and union.
In settling these dual claims the grievant voluntarily complied with
an arbitration process enacted by management pursuant to the
terms of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Concili-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an individual in violation of this section.
4. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
5. Id.
6. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
7. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
8. 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975). This article focuses on the Basic Vegetable Products arbitra-
tion process as one which typifies an expanded arbitration procedure. However, other arbitra-
tors have utilized this process and concluded in light of Alexander that their awards should
be given "great weight" by a district court. See Gulf State Utilities Co. and IBE, 62 Lab.
Arb. 1061 (1974) (Williams, Arbitrator); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. and
Communications Workers of America, 64 Lab. Arb. 317 (1974) (Platt, Arbitrator). Further-
more, some arbitrators have accepted the Supreme Court's invitation in Alexander to apply
Title VII law in determining a grievant's discrimination claim. See Winfield Truck Lines, Inc.
62 Lab. Arb. 935 (1974) (Cohen, Arbitrator); Wausau District Public Schools and Wasau
Educ. Assoc., 64 Lab. Arb. 187 (1975) (Marshall, Arbitrator).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972), amending, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
10. Ms. Cruz, the grievant-employee, alleged that she was fired because of her sex. This
allegation implicated both a Title VII right and a contract right under the anti-discrimination
clause of the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Ms. Cruz's union and her
employer. The arbitrator ruled that the employer had violated the employee's Title VII right
because the employment statistics indicated that the employer had a past pattern of discrimi-
nation and because the employee was not given the training necessary to perform the job even
though the employer had established such a training program. The arbitrator also found that
the collective bargaining agreement was breached by the employer's conduct. Ms. Cruz was
awarded reinstatement, attorney's fees, and fifty percent back pay.
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ation and Settlement Agreement." Under that agreement's arbitra-
tion clause,'" the grievant, the union,'3 and management, all proper
parties to the dispute, were afforded the opportunity to fully partici-
pate in any arbitration proceeding." This included the right to rep-
resentation by counsel, the right to present testimony, and the right
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.'" The agreement provided
that the arbitrator be well versed in Title VII law as well as the law
of the shop'" since Title VII law was to be given priority in settling
the grievant's disputes.'7 The grievant and her union also waived
their Title VII statutory right to sue in federal court by choosing to
arbitrate these disputes.'"
This article will focus on the effect courts should give an arbitra-
tion award made pursuant to the unique procedures adopted in
Basic Vegetable Products and whether the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission should formulate more definite standards
to guide the courts in determining the effect to be given an arbitra-
tor's award in light of the Alexander decision.
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND ARBITRATION
Arbitration has been adopted as the primary method of resolving
grievances arising under a collective bargaining agreement entered
into between management and union. Under this method the par-
ties voluntarily consent to have their disputes determined by an
impartial judge of their own mutual selection and agree to accept
the arbitrator's decision as final and binding. 9 The arbitral process
is set in motion when an employee notifies the union that he has a
11. For a discussion of an EEOC conciliation and settlement agreement see text
accompanying notes 71 through 76 infra.
12. See Paragraph XIV (3) of the Conciliation and Settlement Agreement. A copy of this
agreement is on file at the Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal Office.
13. The union was a party since its contract rights under the collective bargaining agree-
ment were allegedly violated.
14. See Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Agreement Pursuant to Paragraph XIV .3 of Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission Conciliation and Settlement Agreement, Dated as of Septem-
ber 28, 1973.
15. See Paragraph XIV (3) of Conciliation and Settlement Agreement. The right to exam-
ine and cross-examine witnesses was a procedure developed by the Arbitrator pursuant to the
Conciliation and Settlement Agreement.
16. See Paragraph 3 of Agreement Pursuant to Paragraph XIV.3 of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Conciliation and Settlement Agreement, Dated as of September 28,
1973.
17. Generally, the arbitrator uses the law of the shop and is unconcerned with common
law. This distinguishes this arbitration agreement from others.
18. See Paragraph 3 of Agreement Pursuant to Paragraph XIV.3 of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Conciliation and Settlement Agreement, Dated as of September 28,
1973.
19. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, How ARBITRATION WORKs 2 (1973).
[Vol. 7
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grievance.' The union, as the representative of the grievant, han-
dles the employee's complaint through the predetermined grievance
procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement.'
National labor policy favors the settlement of labor disputes by
arbitration. This policy has its statutory basis in the Taft-Hartley
Act."2 Section 203 (d)13 of that Act provides that final adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desir-
able method for settling grievances arising under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Congress, therefore, enacted section 30124 of the
Taft-Hartley Act in order to give federal courts jurisdiction over
suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements.
The Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills "
held that the congressional policy embodied in section 203(d) of the
Act was to promote industrial peace and that the grievance arbitra-
tion provision of a collective bargaining agreement was a major
factor in achieving that goal. The Court declared that the agreement
to arbitrate was the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."6
Viewed in that light, the Court reasoned section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act does more than confer jurisdiction on the court - it
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these
20. Under standard arbitration clauses every grievance, unless specifically excluded, is
deemed to be included within the proper scope of arbitration. Procter & Gamble Independent
Union of Port Ivory v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 647, (2d Cir. 1962), citing United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582, 583 (1960).
21. The usual successive steps of the grievance procedure are intended to settle disputes
on the basis of the agreement between the employer and the union prior to reaching the
arbitration step. C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 129 (3rd ed. 1970). If the
grievance is not settled in the earlier stages of the grievance procedure then it reaches the
final step - the arbitration proceeding. However, it is the union rather than the individual
employee which has control of the manner of presentation of the grievance in the arbitration
proceeding. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
The employee cannot demand that the union take his grievance to arbitration, since the
right to require arbitration is based on the agreement to arbitrate. This agreement can only
be enforced by one of the two contracting parties: the union and the employer. Black-Clawson
Co. v. I.A.M. Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). The union, however, does owe the
employee a duty of fair representation. The duty is one which developed as an incident of
the union's exclusive representative status as representative of all unit employees. Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
see Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment. A Comparative Evaluation of
Forums, 46 WASH. L. REv. 455 (1971). However, the Court in Vaca held that although this
duty exists the individual employee does not have an absolute right to have a meritorious
grievance taken to arbitration. Enforcement of the duty requires that the employee show that
the union's refusal to process the grievance was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 386
U.S. at 191.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1970).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. Id. at 455.
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arbitration agreements - the best means of insuring industrial
peace .27
In the Steelworkers Trilogy,2" the Court expanded its policy of
specifically enforcing arbitration agreements and awards to include
a policy of deferring to arbitral awards. These cases established the
policy of federal courts in reviewing arbitration decisions as one
limited to determining whether the grievance is covered by the
collective bargaining agreements.29 Furthermore, doubts as to the
coverage of the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of
arbitration .3  An arbitrator's award will be enforced by the court
even if the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract differs from
that of the court's.31 These decisions are based on the rationale that
the collective bargaining agreement which includes the grievance
arbitration machinery is an effort to erect a system of industrial self
government which will provide industrial peace rather than in-
dustrial strife and economic dislocation. 3 The swift disposition of
grievances is an important goal and a principle virtue of arbitration.
Arbitration, therefore, provides the remedy for poor labor relations
which could result from the failure to settle grievances promptly.
When a collective bargaining agreement with a grievance arbitra-
tion provision contains an anti-discrimination clause an employee
27. Id.
28. The Steelworkers Trilogy is the popular name of the following Supreme Court cases:
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
29. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
30. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
31. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
32. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580, 585 (1960).
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which is authorized to administer the provi-
sions of the Taft-Hartley Act, has also adopted the policy of selective deferral to arbitration.
The NLRB announced this policy in Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
The Board stated that where disputes present both contractual and unfair labor practice
issues and there was a prior arbitral decision, it will refrain from exercising its jurisdiction to
resolve the unfair labor practice. The Board will defer if the arbitration proceedings are fair
and regular, if all the parties agree to be bound, and if the decision of the arbitrator is not
repugnant to the purpose and policies of the Act. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
That policy has been enlarged to include pre-arbitration deferral. In Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), the Board stated it will defer to arbitration even though the
dispute had not yet come before the arbitrator. The Board, however, retains jurisdiction of
the alleged unfair labor practice until it is demonstrated that the allegation is adequately
resolved through arbitration. Thereafter, the Board applies the Spielberg standards to deter-
mine if deferral is warranted. The deferral doctrine emanates from the Board's policy to
encourage the voluntary settlement of labor disputes and to effectuate the Act's goal of
promoting industrial peace. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See also Nash, Board Referral to Arbitra-
tion and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: Some Preliminary Observations, 25 LAB. L.J. 259, 260
(1974).
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who alleges discrimination has dual claims: one based on a violation
of a Title VII right and one based on a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. While national labor policy encourages the
settlement of contractual disputes through the grievance arbitration
process, a question remains whether the arbitration process can be
used to resolve Title VII claims.
TITLE VII AND ARBITRATION
While Title VII is silent as to the use of arbitration in resolving
claims of discrimination,33 the Act's legislative history does indicate
that the statute is not intended as the exclusive means of relief from
employment discrimination.34 Thus the extent to which arbitration
can be effectively used in such cases remains unsettled. It is clear
that the use of available arbitration machinery is not a prerequisite
to bringing a Title VII action. However, prior to Alexander, the
courts had disagreed as to whether submission to final arbitration
precluded an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under
Title VII.3e
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,37 the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that grievance arbitration is not a bar to an employee's
seeking judicial resolution of a Title VII claim. The Court in
Alexander was confronted with the conflict between the individual's
statutory right to bring suit under Title VII and the national labor
policy of settling disputes through arbitration.38 Alexander, a black
employee, was discharged by the Gardner-Denver Company for al-
legedly producing too much scrap. Following his dismissal, Alexan-
der had his grievance determined by four separate tribunals: the
grievance procedure which led to arbitration and a determination
for the Company; the Colorado Human Rights Commission which
dismissed the case; an EEOC investigation which found that the
claim was not based on a reasonable cause; and the federal district
court which granted summary judgment for the Company on the
33. See Hutchings v. U.S. Industries, 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
34. 110 CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964).
35. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Ninth Circuit has held that even a favorable arbitration award on a claim of racial
discrimination does not necessarily preclude an employee from court action for additional
relief under Title VII. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1973).
36. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
402 U.S. 689 (1971); Hutchings v. U.S. Industries, 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
37. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
38. See text accompanying notes 19 through 32 supra.
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basis of the arbitration award. 9 Four adverse determinations not-
withstanding, Alexander's pro se petition for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court was granted.
In ruling against preclusion by arbitration, the Supreme Court
noted that the grounds for its decision were based on the purposes
and procedures of Title VII. Congress, the Court stated, had enacted
Title VII
to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Moreover, the ending of discrimination was to be given the "highest
priority."4 ' To effect this policy, the Court held the statutory
scheme vests the federal courts with the "final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII '1 42 along with "plenary powers to enforce
the statutory requirements."4 Title VII guarantees an individual
the right to have his statutory claim of discrimination adjudicated
before a court of law." Therefore, a prior arbitral decision does not
foreclose the individual's right to sue nor does it divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction. 5 The Court also stressed that "legislative
enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord
parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination" and that
"submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later sub-
mission to another."4
WAIVER OF TITLE VII RIGHTS
The Court in Alexander also held that the employee had not
waived his right to bring a Title VII action by submitting his dispute
to a prior arbitration proceeding: "[T]here can be no prospective
waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." 47 The Court empha-
sized that the individual's statutory right to sue under Title VII is
not part of the collective bargaining agreement package, but is in-
stead an individual right to equal employment opportunity." Nev-
39. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1209
(10th Cir. 1972).
40. 415 U.S. at 44.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 47.
44. Id. at 45.
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. at 47-48.
47. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). The Court also held that the principles of collateral
estoppel and res judicata did not apply. Id. at 49 n.10.
48. Id. at 52.
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ertheless, the decision does recognize that an employee may waive
his right to pursue a Title VII action as part of a settlement of his
employment discrimination claim insofar as such consent to settle-
ment is voluntary and knowing. 9 The use of the word "settlement"
in the opinion indicates that the grievant must receive consideration
for his waiver before it can be found valid. Relying upon Alexander,
a district court recently stated that there could be a legal waiver of
additional back-pay claims where a release is signed knowingly and
voluntarily for valuable consideration."0
The arbitration clause used in Basic Vegetable Products required
that the individual sign an express waiver of her Title VII right to
sue. The grievant waived that right after her Title VII claim had
already accrued. The waiver, therefore, unlike the one in Alexander,
was not prospective."' However, under Alexander for a waiver to be
valid it must also be part of a voluntary and knowing settlement.
An arbitration agreement like that signed by the grievant in Basic
Vegetable Products is evidence that the grievant voluntarily chose
arbitration as the method of settling her dispute in lieu of a Title
VII right to sue. In consideration for her waiver, the grievant re-
ceived an arbitration procedure that was accessible, fast, and inex-
pensive. The arbitration process also provided that the grievant be
represented by counsel, the arbitrator be versed in public law, and
the analysis of the grievance be based primarily on Title VII law.
Conversely, a grievant could argue that since the arbitration clause
was part of an EEOC conciliation and settlement agreement an
element of coercion existed. This could be inferred from the fact
49. Id. at 52 n.15.
The knowing and voluntary standard was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and has been repeatedly used as the test to determine whether
an individual waived a constitutional right. The Court in Johnson also stated that the courts
will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of a fundamental constitutional
right. Courts have also held that the waiver must be distinctly made and the fact that the
individual knows his rights and intends to waive them must plainly appear. Universal Gas
Co., v. Central Ill. Public Service Co., 102 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1939). Furthermore, ignorance
of a material fact negates waiver. Wood v. U.S., 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
As a general rule, rights granted by statute may also be waived unless the statute is
intended to protect the general rights of the public rather than private rights. A waiver cannot
be allowed to operate so as to transgress public policy or morals. Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332
(1877). In Basic Vegetable Products the argument could be made that since Title VII was
enacted to effect the policy of freedom from employment discrimination, and for the benefit
of all those discriminated against, each individual who has the statutory right to sue is acting
as a private attorney general to effectuate that policy and is acting not for themselves alone
but for the public good.
50. See Saxbe v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, 63 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
51. See Paragraph 5 of Agreement Pursuant to Paragraph XIV .3 of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Conciliation and Settlement Agreement, Dated as of September 28,
1975.
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that the grievant, a Latino woman employed by a company that had
a record of past discrimination, was faced with a choice of pursuing
her own cause of action or a settlement procedure suggested by the
government. If the grievant chose to go it alone she would incur the
financial costs of maintaining the suit as well as the repercussion of
her lack of legal sophistication. Given the latter argument, it is
doubtful that a court would hold a Basic Vegetable Products type
waiver to be voluntary or knowing under Alexander.52
DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
Assuming arguendo that the waiver in Basic Vegetable Products
fails the Alexander test, the question arises whether a court should
defer to the arbitrator's award made pursuant to the expanded arbi-
tration proceeding. The Supreme Court in Alexander specifically
addressed and rejected a rule of complete deferral to arbitration
decisions on discrimination claims. The Court held the conse-
quences of such a policy "would be to deprive the petitioner of his
statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a federal court."53
The Court stated that "arbitration [is] a comparatively inappro-
priate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII."54
The arbitrator is guided by the collective bargaining agreement. His
expertise is primarily in the law of the shop. Title VII, however,
requires expertise in substantive federal law and consequently re-
52. It would be erroneous to conclude that the EEOC in putting an arbitration clause with
a Title VII waiver in its conciliation and settlement agreement was approving that technique.
That conciliation and settlement agreement was agreed to before the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Alexander. Since Alexander, the EEOC has refused to permit the inclusion of that
type of arbitration clause into its conciliation agreements. Telephone interview with Counsel
for Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., San Francisco, California, July 24, 1975.
The process was developed with those particular parties and did not necessarily meet with
the agreement of the General Council of the EEOC. Telephone interview with Marvin Rogoff,
Special Assistant for Labor Relations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office
of Compliance, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1975. [hereinafter cited as Rogoff Interview].
An EEOC staff member has commented:
[T]he Commission itself has not considered nor acted upon policy in the area of
either deferring to such private processes or giving weight to the decisions ensuing
from such procedures.
Letter from Marvin Rogoff, Special Assistant for Labor Relations, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, Washington, D.C., to Laura Boyer, July 30, 1975 [hereinafter cited as
Rogoff letter].
Furthermore, it is very doubtful that it could in fact support such a position under the
statutory plan of Title VII and its congressional mandate. See text accompanying notes 66
through 76 infra. Nor does it appear, in view of current case law, that the courts would allow
them such a position. See text accompanying notes 77 through 81 infra. Since putting binding
arbitration clauses in its conciliation and settlement agreements appears to make it and not
the courts the adjudicator of Title VII rights.
53. 415 U.S. at 56.
54. Id.
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quires the competence of the courts.15 Moreover, the informality
which enables arbitration to function as an efficient, inexpensive
and expeditious means for dispute resolution renders arbitration a
less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than
the federal courts.5" The Court also expressed concern that the stan-
dards needed to cure the procedural weaknesses would make arbi-
tration a procedurally complex, expensive and time consuming pro-
cess.57 The enforcement of a standard which adequately insures ef-
fectuation of Title VII rights would almost require courts to make
de novo determinations of the employee's claims. Therefore, the
court stated, "It is uncertain whether any minimal savings in judi-
cial time and expense would justify the risk to vindication of Title
VII rights.""
In addition, the Court expressed doubt that the individual em-
ployee's Title VII right would be sufficiently protected in the griev-
ance arbitration process where the union has exclusive control over
the manner and extent to which a grievant is represented. In arbi-
tration it is likely the interests of the individual employee will be
subordinated to the collective interest of all employees in the bar-
gaining unit.59 The Court noted, ". . . harmony of interest between
the union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed,
especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made."6
THE EXPANDED ARBITRATION PROCESS
Although the Court did rule against absolute deferral, the deci-
sion does not discourage the use of arbitration in resolving Title VII
claims. In fact the Court encouraged its use, citing arbitration's
conciliatory and therapeutic effect." The Court acknowledged that
arbitral decisions may be admitted as evidence and accorded such
weight as the district court deems appropriate." It is significant to
note, however, that the Court listed in a footnote factors which
could be considered in determining the weight given an arbitral
award:
55. Id. at 57.
56. Id. at 58. Labor arbitration practices vary greatly. The process can include: the pres-
ence of the grievant, representation of the grievant by counsel, rules of evidence or the right
to cross-examine. See FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (1973).
57. 415 U.S. at 58.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id. at 58 n.19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 60.
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1) the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that conforms substantially with Title VII;
2) the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum;
3) the adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination;
4) the special competence of particular arbitrators."
The Court further stated that "[w]here an arbitral determination
gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court
may properly accord it great weight."64
In Basic Vegetable Products the parties made a diligent attempt
to comply with the guidelines suggested by the Court in Alexander.
All the parties agreed to have the arbitrator decide the Title VII
claim and to have it specifically analyzed and determined primarily
on Title VII law by an arbitrator who was known for his competence
in public law. The fairness of the proceeding was evidenced by the
fact that grievant and union were represented by private counsel,
both sides were provided with a full opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses and to present testimony, and a full record
was made of the proceedings."
Applying those facts to the guidelines listed in Alexander, the
arbitral award in Basic Vegetable Products meets the Court's sug-
gested standards and thus should be accorded "great weight." The
Supreme Court, however, left the determination of "great weight"
entirely to the district court. No specific guidance for determining
the weight to be given such awards was offered by the Court.
THE ROLE OF THE EEOC
The EEOC may provide guidelines to be used for determining the
weight to be given arbitral awards. 6 The 1964 Civil Rights Act cre-
ated the EEOC as a conciliation agency. Its authority was limited
to "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."67
Enforcement was left to the private individual who was given the
63. Id. at 59 n.21.
64. Id.
65. 64 Lab. Arb. at 625 (1975).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (a), (k) provide in part:
(a) The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section
2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.
(k) In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and
the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
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statutory right to bring suit based upon alleged employment dis-
crimination in federal district courts.
Senate Bill 2515 was introduced in 1972 to amend the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and to give the Commission administrative cease and
desist powers, thus enabling it to investigate and adjudicate a
charge of discrimination. The Commission's order would then have
been subject to judicial review. 8 However, the 1972 amendments as
passed did not provide the EEOC with these powers. Instead, it
merely reaffirmed the Commission's role as a conciliation agency.
The amendment did give the EEOC the right to bring a civil action
in a federal district court against any private individual."
The 1972 amendments did not alter the individual's right to bring
an employment discrimination suit in federal court. After initially
filing his claim with the EEOC, the individual can bring suit in the
following situations: the Commission, after investigation, finds no
reasonable cause exists to believe Title VII was violated; the EEOC
finds reasonable cause but is unable to conciliate and does not itself
bring suit; or the EEOC does conciliate with the alleged violator,
but the individual does not choose to be a party to the conciliation
agreement." Therefore, the statutory language of Title VII provides
two primary methods of enforcing an individual's Title VII claim -
the EEOC's compliance process and the individual's right to seek
judicial determination of the claim.
The conciliation process is initiated after a charge is filed, an
investigation is completed and reasonable cause is determined.
Conciliation attempts to achieve voluntary compliance with Title
VII by means of a written agreement.7 The agreement contains a
resolution of the issues and the assurance that the party charged 2
will terminate unlawful employment practices and take appropriate
action. By signing the agreement, the charging party waives his
right to sue the alleged discriminator subject to the latter's comply-
ing with the terms of the agreement. 4 The conciliation agreement
is enforced by the Commission." However, a conciliation agreement
68. Staff of Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Equal Employment Opportunity Act at 426. (Comm.
Print 1972).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1975).
72. Under Title VII, a charged party can include employer, union, or employment agency.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1972).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1975).
74. 1 CCH, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
CONCILIATION STANDARDS § 62, at 1047 (1975).
75. Id. Enforcement is primarily accomplished through the reporting provisions of the
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will receive judicial enforcement where the parties, on a joint mo-
tion, seek court approval of their agreement. On the granting of such
a motion, the terms of the agreement are incorporated into a consent
decree.76 This was the procedure which produced the conciliation
and settlement agreement considered in Basic Vegetable Products.
Courts view the primary role of the EEOC as seeking the elimina-
tion of unlawful employment practices by informal means which
lead to voluntary compliance.77 The EEOC has no power to adjudi-
cate.78 The Supreme Court has held that an individual is not barred
from bringing suit even where the Commission finds no grounds for
his complaint. 9 In addition, if a conciliation agreement is accepta-
ble to the EEOC and not to the charging party, the latter may refuse
to sign it and may file suit.0 This is true even where the agreement
is favorable to the parties. To hold otherwise would make the EEOC
the final adjudicator of an individual's Title VII grievance which
would ignore Congress' mandate that federal courts have the ulti-
mate power to determine Title VII rights."'
Therefore, while the courts are cognizant of both methods of Title
VII implementation - the EEOC's voluntary compliance process
and the individual's right to judicial remedies - they are solicitous
and protective of the latter method. Although recognizing that the
EEOC was created to implement Title VII and end employment
discrimination through a voluntary compliance procedure, the
courts have repeatedly enforced the individual's right to his day in
court in Title VII claims. Nevertheless, when an employee seeks
arbitration as a means of redressing discriminatory practices, the
EEOC is the proper agency to establish arbitral guidelines pursuant
to Alexander.
conciliation agreement. The Commission will keep the case open until there is proof of
compliance with Title VII. Thereafter, they may review compliance either on their motion or
the request of any charging party.
76. Interview with John Rowe, Litigation Attorney-Senior, Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission, Chicago, in Chicago, Illinois, July 21, 1975.
77. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Fekete v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3rd Cir. 1970); Hutchings v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.
1970).
78. See, e.g., McGriff v. A.O. Smith Corp., 51 F.R.D. 479 (D.S.C. 1971); Williams v. New
Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972).
79. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
80. Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968), afifd, 409 F.2d 289 (7th
Cir. 1969).
Where the Commission achieved voluntary compliance with the employer, union, and
fifteen of the complaining parties, the other nineteen parties who did not accept the agree-
ment were not denied their day in court. Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp. 1145
(E.D. Va. 1970).
81. Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. La. 1972).
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POTENTIAL EEOC ARBITRAL GUIDELINES
Taking the Supreme Court's suggestion that arbitration decisions
which meet certain standards be given "great weight" in a Title VII
trial de novo, the Commission is researching and developing the
capabilities of a private grievance process for discrimination com-
plaints.12 The necessary components of such a procedure are: the
matter be grievable under the contract, the grievant have free choice
of representation, SI the facts be fully developed, the record be com-
plete, and the arbitrator have the legal background to handle Title
VII claims." This would require the arbitrators to become more
skilled and better trained in public law. 5 Moreover, there must be
more minority and female arbitrators."e The fact that there are so
few female or minority arbitrators infers that the arbitration profes-
sion itself is insensitive to the problem of employment discrimina-
tion. If the arbitration profession has failed to recognize the problem
in its own ranks it cannot be expected to effectively adjudicate the
issues of employment discrimination in the industrial sector.
Although efforts are being directed towards making the grievance
arbitration machinery more effective, the EEOC believes that an
individual should not be left at the mercy of the arbitration system.
The purpose of these guidelines would not be to restrict the grie-
vant's remedies, but rather broaden them by utilizing the arbitra-
tor's skills and the elaborate grievance machinery.88
The Supreme Court in Alexander has held that arbitration will
not preclude a Title VII action in a federal court. A result of this
82. Letter from Marvin Rogoff, Special Assistant for Labor Relations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., to Laura Boyer, August 5, 1975:
[Olne way by which the Commission might express the opinion that such an
arbitration award be given great weight is through the issuance of guidelines, an
avenue under current exploration.
83. This situation is to be distinguished from regular grievance arbitration, where the
employee is not a party and his grievance is represented by the union. Under these guidelines,
the employee need not choose the union as his representative. For a discussion of the union's
role in arbitration of employment discrimination claims see note 21 supra.
84. See Rogoff Interview, supra note 52.
85. Id. For a thorough analysis of the capacity of the arbitration process and arbitrator
to deal with legal issues, see Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An
Empirical Study, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS (1975). The analysis is based on the author's survey taken February, 1975 of all
United States members of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
86. See Rogoff Interview, supra note 52.
87. As of 1972, the National Academy of Arbitrators claimed only four blacks and three
women members out of a membership of approximately three hundred and fifty. Gould,
Judicial Review: As Arbitrators See It, in LABOR ARBITRATION AT THE QUARTER CENTURY MARK,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIvrH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 114,
117 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gould].
88. See Rogoff Interview, supra note 52.
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decision could be that management and union will discontinue arbi-
tration of employee discrimination claims when the grievant is guar-
anteed a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. Such a result would
be undesirable for minority and women employees, since arbitration
presents a more expeditious route than protracted administrative
and judicial proceedings.89 Furthermore, in refusing to arbitrate dis-
crimination claims, the employment problems of women and minor-
ities will remain outside of the union's concern. 0 This will add impe-
tus to the prevalent union attitude that employment discrimination
claims are not their responsibility.9 Women and minorities will con-
tinue to exist as second class union members.
If, however, the EEOC establishes standards pursuant to
Alexander, which encourage courts to accord arbitration decisions
great weight, management and union may be persuaded to use this
expanded arbitration process as a means of settling discrimination
claims.12 If altered arbitration is successful in enabling employment
discrimination claims to be effectively resolved within the grievance
arbitration machinery, two national policies - industry's right to
settle its own grievances and the individual's right to be free from
employment discrimination - would be brought into harmony.
Furthermore, problems facing minority and women union members
will be greatly alleviated.
The strong possibility exists that altered arbitration will not en-
courage union and management to arbitrate employee discrimina-
tion claims. The mere possibility of a court giving the arbitration
decisions "great weight" may not provide sufficient incentive for
union and management to utilize arbitration. Perhaps they will take
the risk that the employee will not pursue his Title VII grievance to
the courts - a lengthy and potentially expensive process - nor seek
assistance from the EEOC with its complicated procedure and
backlog of cases.93
The alternative to relying upon union and management's incorpo-
ration of these standards into a collective bargaining agreement is
for the EEOC to embody them into its conciliation agreements. This
would require an initial filing of suit by the grievant. It would also
require the EEOC to effectively police the agreement to discover
89. Gould, supra note 87, at 131.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Letter from Marvin Rogoff, Special Assistant for Labor Relations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Council, Washington, D.C., to Laura Boyer, October 3, 1975.
93. As of July 1974, the EEOC backlog exceeded 100,000 cases. Daily Labor Report,
August 30, 1974, A-13.
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any breach. 4 The Commission would be required to seek judicial
sanctions against the breaching party. Years could pass before the
employee's grievance would be resolved.
THE IMPACT OF Albemarle
The two mentioned alternatives would prove successful if union
and management would commit themselves to altered arbitration
as a method of resolving employment discrimination claims. The
Supreme Court, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,"5 may have pro-
vided the stimulant for such a commitment. Justice Stewart speak-
ing for the majority stated:
It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that
"provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and un-
ions . . . to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an
unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history. 19 6
In Albemarle, the employees brought a class action against the
plant owner and the employees' union alleging employment dis-
crimination. Initially the employees sued only for permanent in-
junctive relief against "'any policy, practice, custom or usage' at
the plant that violated Title VIL." ' Nearly five years after initiating
the suit, plaintiffs filed a claim for a back pay award. 8 The Supreme
Court held that after a finding of unlawful discrimination back pay
should be awarded to the class of plaintiffs. This included the un-
named parties in plaintiffs class who had not themselves filed
charges.9 The Court in Albemarle based its award of back pay on
the twin statutory objective of Title VII-to achieve equality of
employment opportunity and to make persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination.'00 The Court declared that
district courts may deny back pay only when to do so would not
frustrate these dual statutory purposes.'0'
CONCLUSION
Potential Title VII financial liability, not only for lawyer's fees
and court costs0 2 but also for back pay awards, should provide the
94. See note 75 supra.
95. 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
96. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 at 2371-72 (1975), quoting United
States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
97. Id. at 2367.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2370 n.8.
100. Id. at 2371-72.
101. Id. at 2373.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
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needed stimulus for union and management to accept altered arbi-
tration as a method of resolving employment discrimination claims.
Altered arbitration would be an effective way to limit their financial
liability. The grievance will be settled at an early stage at much
lower costs. There will be fewer charges filed under Title VII
proceedings and, therefore, fewer cases should reach the federal
courts. Furthermore, where the cases do reach the courts, the arbi-
trator's award, if he complied with the altered arbitration process,
should be given "great weight" by the court. This would reduce
court time and costs. Equality in employment opportunity is an
ideal which will be realized when it becomes too expensive to ignore.
Perhaps that time has come.
LAURA G. BOYER
